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In parallel contingent valuation and laboratory experiments this paper demonstrates 
that culpability - defined as the amount of social damage resulting from an 
individual’s actions – has a positive influence on willingness to pay to reduce 
negative externalities.  The nation-wide, web-based CV study estimated a 
respondent’s carbon footprint and provided information about the carbon footprints of 
peers.  In the laboratory experiment student subject purchase “private commodities” 
(analogous to electricity) that generate a negative public externality (analogous to 
pollution) for a group in which they are a member.  The subjects are subsequently 
given an opportunity to contribute to a fund that would reduce the negative harm 
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In the last decade, economists have used stated preference surveys to elicit willingness to 
pay (WTP) values for policies that reduce the impact of greenhouse gasses (Layton and 
Brown, 2000; Berrens et al., 2004; Cameron, 2005; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006; 
Cameron and Gerdes, 2007). Reflecting the substantial market for voluntary carbon offsets, 
estimated recently to be in excess of $236 million and doubling annually (World Bank 
2008; New Carbon Finance 2009), other research has been directed toward assessing 
willingness to purchase voluntary carbon  offsets (Brouwer et al., 2009; MacKerron et al., 
2009).  
With the exception of Brouwer et al. (2009), a notable omission in this body of 
research from a psychological/behavioral economics perspective has been the relationship 
between individual WTP and perceived culpability with respect to greenhouse gas 
emissions. By perceived culpability we mean the amount of social damage resulting from 
an individual’s actions. In a test of the “passenger pays principle”, Brouwer et al. (2009) 
found that air travelers’ perceived responsibility for climate change, awareness of the 
environmental impact of flying, and the frequency of flying were all positively correlated 
with WTP for a per-flight carbon offset program. This notion of personal responsibility in 
creating public harm is an extension of what Kahneman et al. (1993) refer to as an “outrage 
effect”, in which people are willing to pay more to avoid an environmental problem if they think it is human-caused than if they think that it is an outcome of nature (Bulte et al., 
2003).  Kahneman et al. (1993) and Brown et al. (2002), amongst others, have 
demonstrated this “outrage effect” on CV responses. 
Notions of personal responsibility have also played a role in psychological research 
on actual choices with respect to the environment. Building on the well known “Cialdini 
Effect”, Schultz et al. (2007) and Ayers et al. (2009) have demonstrated that monitoring 
energy consumption and informing individuals of their personal levels of consumption 
relative to neighborhood norm could provide an incentive for above-average households to 
reduce energy consumption.  This we refer to as a within commodity effect: impacts on 
purchases of good X are affected by information about peers’ consumption of good X.  
Other recent research has explored a cross commodity effect of green purchases (X) on 
other behaviors (Y): for example, a study by Mazur and Zhong (2009) reports that allowing 
people to purchase green household goods instead of non-green household goods, makes 
them more likely to cheat on a test. 
In this research we build upon and extend these ideas by exploring how WTP to 
prevent a public bad is affected by perceived personal culpability - defined as the amount 
of social damage resulting from an individual’s actions - in a controlled set of experiments. 
We find that  information about perceived personal culpability does affect individual WTP, 
however, only when the information is provided relative to the social damages caused by 
others. Specifically, telling a subject that they are more culpable than somebody else does 
increase WTP, whereas manipulating a subject's sense of culpability absent information 
about others has mixed effects across experiments. These culpability effects are not only important from the perspective of better understanding psychological factors underlying 
actual contributions and contingent values, but also have practical policy import.  
To explore the role of culpability in willingness to pay for prevent environmental 
harm, we use both web-based contingent valuation (CV) and real-money laboratory 
experiments. The contingent valuation study asks consumers to calculate their energy 
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption, and then elicits 
willingness to purchase green electricity as a means to offset carbon emissions.  In an effort 
to parallel the field contingent valuation study, the laboratory experiment has student 
subject purchase “private commodities” (analogous to electricity) that generate a negative 
public externality (analogous to pollution) for a group in which they are a member.  The 
subjects are subsequently given an opportunity to contribute to a fund that would reduce 
the negative harm created by the externality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the following two sections 
we present the experimental design of the contingent valuation and the laboratory 
experiments, respectively.   The results for both studies are presented in Section IV, and the 
final section concludes. 
 
II. Culpability and Willingness to Pay For Carbon Offsets: The CV study.  
The broad objective of the contingent valuation (CV) survey was to gather information 
from participants that allowed us to calculate a carbon footprint for each respondent and 
then elicit their willingness to pay for a green electricity program given information about 
their own carbon footprint and, in some treatments, their carbon footprint relative to those 
of another survey participant.  Participants for the online hypothetical survey were recruited through The StudyResponse Project, a nationwide panel of 95,574 people.  Participants 
were chosen at random and emailed the URL for the survey.  For completing the survey, 
participants received $5.  520 panelists were invited to participate, and we received 420 
completed surveys for an 81% response rate. 
There were four steps in the survey: I) Eliciting demographic questions to calculate 
the subject’s carbon footprint; II) Providing information about International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) predictions on the impacts of climate change; III) Showing 
Subjects their estimated annual carbon footprint based on the input they provided; and IV) 
Eliciting individual demand for green electricity.  For the control treatment, subjects were 
not provided any information about the carbon footprint of others.  All other subjects 
received information about the carbon footprint of “Others like you who took this survey”. 
In the spirit of Cameron (2005), Part I consisted of several web pages eliciting 
information about energy use, including housing characteristics (type, age, size of 
residence, and location), home energy use (monthly electric and gas bill expenditures, type 
of fuel used to heat house, whether the household generates or purchases electricity); 
automobiles (number, models, use of each vehicle) and transportation choices (use of 
public transportation, frequency of short and long domestic flights, frequency of 
international flights).  Subjects were also asked about whether they purchased carbon 
offsets and if so, how many had they purchased.  Only 31 subjects reported having 
purchased carbon offsets. 
Subsequent to reporting the above information, subjects were provided with three 
IPCC climate policy scenarios (business as usual, small emissions reductions and high 
emissions reductions) and their anticipated consequences as presented below in Box 1.   The purpose of this screen was two-fold.  First, we wanted to make respondents aware of 
current climate projections and relative policy options.   To a certain extent, this 
information also served to induce an element of moral outrage for those concerned about 
climate change. 
In Part III, respondents were provided with an estimate of the carbon generated 
from their use of utilities and transportation and, after accounting for offset purchases, their 
estimated carbon footprint (“the total amount of climate changing greenhouse gas 
emissions caused directly and indirectly by your household”) in tons of carbon per year.   
 
Box 1: IPCC Climate Options 
The IPCC has presented several options for reducing climate change, each with different final levels of 
carbon and impacts on the global climate:  
   Business as Usual  Small Emissions Reductions  Aggressive Emissions 
Reductions 
Mean Percent 
change in Carbon 
Emissions from 
2000 to 2050 




8.8-11 degrees (4.9-6.1 degrees 
Celsius)  
7.2-8.8 degrees Fahrenheit (4-
4.9 degrees Celsius)  
3.6-4.3 degrees 
Fahrenheit (2-2.4 
degrees Celsius)  
Sea Level 
Increases  
12-24 inches (0.3 - 0.6 meters) 
Millions at risk of coastal 
flooding 
10-24 inches (0.26 - 0.6 meters) 
Millions at risk of coastal 
flooding.  
Less than 17 inches 
(0.45 meters) 
Extinction Risk   More than 40% of species face 
some risk  
More than 40% of species face 
some risk  
30% of species face 
some risk  
Crops and Famine  
Crop productivity is expected to 
decrease. Global food 
production is expected to 
decrease, causing an increased 
risk of famine. 
Crop productivity is expected to 
decrease. Global food 
production is expected to 
decrease, causing an increased 
risk of famine. 
Crop productivity may 
increase in some 
regions and decrease in 
others. Increased risk 
of famine in some 
areas. 
Other effects  
Increase in intensity and 
frequency of heat waves. 
Increased range for tropical 
diseases. Together, these will 
cause death and sickness, 
placing a substantial burden on 
health services. 
Increase in intensity and 
frequency of heat waves. 
Increased range for tropical 
diseases. Together, these will 
cause death and sickness, 
placing a substantial burden on 
health services.  
Increase in intensity 
and frequency of heat 
waves. Carbon footprints were calculated using two algorithms.  If participants knew their 
electricity and heating expenditures, information about average electricity and fuel prices in 
each state were used to determine annual consumption of electricity and fuel.  (If 
participants knew their fuel expenditures but not their fuel source for heating, a weighted 
average of all fuel sources for the state was used.)  Annual consumption of electricity was 
then converted into CO2 emissions using the average CO2 intensity for each state.  Fuel 
consumption was converted into CO2 emissions using information about CO2 intensity for 
each fuel type. If participants did not know their electricity and heating expenditures, we 
gathered information about their housing structure and compared it to information about 
average energy consumption for houses of similar age, type and size in their state, which 
was then used to calculate CO2 emissions as above.  Information about fuel prices, 
generation mix and average household energy consumption was obtained from the Energy 
Information Administration of the Department of Energy. 
Information about participants’ cars and miles driven was directly computed based 
on combined city/highway fuel economy information from the EPA for every make, model 
and year of car from 1983 to 2009.  For air travel, short flights were assumed to be 100 
miles each way, long flights 750 miles, and international flights 4,250 miles.  Carbon 
offsets reduced the carbon footprint by 168 pounds for every dollar spent, equivalent to 
prevailing rates at popular commercial carbon offset retailers. 
Median estimated carbon emissions for the sample were 17.9 tons per household 
per year.  For subjects in the control group, no other information was provided.  Individuals 
in the treatment groups were informed that  “Others like you who took this survey in the 
past had a carbon footprint of xx tons per year” and whether their contribution was MORE or LESS than this individual.  The “xx” value was randomly assigned to be high (26 tons) 
or low (11 tons), where 26 and 11 tons correspond to the 75
th and 25
th percentiles of the 
carbon footprint distribution in a pre-test.  For example, a subject with an estimated carbon 
footprint of 18 tons and was assigned to the “See Low” group would be told that “Others 
like you who took this survey in the past had a carbon footprint of 11 tons per year” and 
that “Your contribution to global warming is MORE than this average.”  Similarly, a like 
individual who was assigned to the “See High” treatment was “Others like you who took 
this survey in the past had a carbon footprint of 26 tons per year” and that “Your 
contribution to global warming is LESS than this average.”  As will be discussed below, 
the difference between the subject’s carbon footprint and the value associated with the 
reference individual provided a measure of relative culpability. 
  Given this information contingent values were elicited using a modification of a 
green electricity payment card used in Champ and Bishop (2001, 2006) in which 
individuals were given opportunities to buy blocks of energy measured in kilowatt hours.  
As shown in Box 2 each block had a corresponding monthly and annual cost and estimated 
annual tons of CO2 averted based on information available from the Energy Information 
Agency of the Department of Energy.   
In Part IV, debriefing and demographic questions were asked, along with ten 
questions designed to measure environmental concern drawn from the New Environmental 
Paradigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap et al. 2000). This scale is 
widely used in the psychology and sociology literature to characterize an individual’s 
environmental concern based on how the extent to which they agree or disagree with 
various statements of environmental concern: “limits to growth, anthropocentrism, the fragility of the balance of nature, 
rejection of the idea that humans are exempt from the constraints of nature, and 
the possibility of an eco-crisis or ecological catastrophe. The response categories 
range between 1 and 5 so that high scores correspond to a stronger pro-
environmental attitude than low scores (with the ordering reversed for the 
statements that reject the NEP-paradigm)” (Ek and Söderholm, 2008, p. 175) 
 
Past studies of willingness to pay for green electricity have found the aggregated values 
across a series of NEP questions to be a significant explanatory variable (Kotchen and 
Moore, 2007; Ek and Söderholm, 2008). 
 
 
Box 2: The Green Electricity Contingent Valuation Question 
Suppose your electric utility were to offer you renewable energy appropriate to your area.  
For example, wind, solar, geothermal, or tidal power could all be offered, depending on 
your geographical location.  Choose the option that you would like to purchase from the 
table below. (Information from the Energy Information Agency of the Department of 
Energy) 
  
 II. Culpability and WTP to Reduce Negative Externalities: Lab Experiment  
We endeavored to develop a parallel experimental economics laboratory in which 
subjects purchase “private commodities” (analogous to electricity) that generate a negative 
public externality (analogous to pollution) for a group in which they are a member.  The 
subjects are subsequently given an opportunity to contribute to a fund that would reduce 
the negative harm created by the externality, akin, we believe to the opportunity to 
purchase green electricity. The added benefit of the lab design is that we can 
experimentally vary the level of consumer demand. 
Subjects (n=240) were recruited from a variety of undergraduate business and 
economics courses at Cornell University. Pen and paper experimental sessions were 
conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Decision Research in cohorts 
ranging in size from 10 to 20. A session lasted approximately 45 minutes and average 
earnings were $14.41. 
Subjects were randomly assigned into groups of five anonymous participants 
including themselves.  Adapting Plott’s (1983) seminal externality experiments, each 
individual was given a balance of $9 at the beginning of each of five rounds and a per-unit 
value (demand) function for a commodity that could be purchased at a cost of $1 
(experimental dollars were converted to real dollars at a rate of $15 experimental  = $1 
real.) Subjects in each group were randomly assigned into high, medium and low demands 
and the choices offered to individuals were presented as in Box 3 below. 
In addition to private return for each commodity unit purchased, subjects were 
informed that each unit purchased would impose a negative externality on the entire group,  
Your group also shares a GROUP FUND.  This group fund began with 300 
experimental dollars, and at the end of the experiment, any dollars in this group fund will be divided equally between all members of the group.  Your 
actions and the actions of other people in your group in Round 1 may have 
reduced the total amount of dollars remaining in the group fund. 
 
In Round 2, every unit of the commodity that you purchase decreases the 
number of experimental dollars in the group fund by 1.25.  (Because there 
are five people in your group, every unit of the commodity that you purchase 
reduces the amount in the group fund by 0.25 dollars per person.  Likewise, 
every unit of the commodity purchased by everyone else in the group reduces 
the amount in the group fund by 1.25 dollars and therefore costs everyone 
else 0.25 dollars.) 
 
Hence, the optimal private decision would be to purchase only those commodities with a 
value of $1.25 or higher. After accounting for the “external” impact of their own 
consumption on themselves, subjects with low, medium and high demands were expected 
to buy 15, 25, and 35 commodity units respectively. Examples were worked through with 
the entire session on a whiteboard at the front of the lab, and after each decision, subjects 
were asked to calculate and report their own private returns and the impacts of their private 
decisions on other members of the group. 
  Box 3: Sample High Demand Function and Choice Setting 
Units of 
Commodity 
1st  2nd 3rd 4th 5th  6th 7th  8th 9th 
Value of 
the unit 
2.20  2.05  1.90 1.75 1.60  1.45 1.25  1.15 1.00 
Cost of the 
unit 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Subjects were asked to sum their commodity purchases over the first five rounds 
and write this number down on a “passing sheet” which was submitted (sent) to the 
experimental moderator.   Following a design in which “sending” subjects and “receiving” 
subjects were matched using a random number generator the experimental moderator 
passed these sheets to  the assigned  receiving subject.  Each receiving subject was asked to 
record their own total purchases and the amount of total purchases that they saw on the 
sheet that was sent/passed to them.  A total of 75 subjects were sent values higher than their 
own value, 75  received values lower than their own value, and 90 senders received their 
own passing sheet.  
In the sixth round of the experiment, subjects were informed that “Based on the 
purchase decisions in the first 5 rounds made by you and others in your group, the total 
amount of dollars in the group fund has declined” (See instructions in the Appendix).  Once 
again each subject was endowed with $9.  However, in this round individuals participated 
in a standard public goods contributions game in which each dollar contributed was 
multiplied by 1.25 and distributed equally across all members of the group. Following this last round individuals were asked a series of debriefing questions 
and the same NEP questions used in the CV field experiment. 
IV. Econometric Modeling CV and Laboratory Responses. 
  In this section we provide preliminary regression results for parsimonious models of 
both the CV and laboratory experiments.  As of the date of this conference draft, the 
robustness of these results have yet to be adequately evaluated.  
  In modeling the responses to the CV experiment, the dependent variable was 
kilowatt hours purchased.  The sample was split into two groups: a “Treatment” group in 
which the subjects were informed about the carbon footprints of “Others like [them] who 
took this survey in the past” and a “Control” group in which no such relative information 
was provided.  For the treatment group, we constructed a relative culpability variable (Own 
minus Saw) measuring the difference between the subject’s carbon and the “other” carbon 
footprint he/she was shown.    In the least squares regression we also included the subject’s 
own carbon footprint, which we provide as a measure of absolute culpability, and the NEP 
scale response summed over the 10 Likert scale NEP questions.    As shown in the 
regression resulting in Table 1, the coefficient for the absolute measure of culpability 
(Carbon Footprint) is not significant, but both the coefficients for Relative Culpability 
(Own minus Saw) and the NEP  scale were significant and of the expected sign.  The 
difference in significance between the absolute and relative culpability measures suggests 
that simply providing individuals about absolute measure of contributions does not lead to 
differential willingness to purchase green electricity offsets. However, contributions appear 
to be affected by how much of the negative externality individual’s contribute relative to others.  This latter result is depicted in Figure 1, along with average green electricity 
purchases of the control group. 
  Response patterns differed somewhat in the laboratory experiment.  Here 
contributions to reduce the public bad were initially modeled as a function of the subject’s 
own total commodity purchases over the first five rounds (Own Purchases), the NEP scale 
and a measure of the difference between their expected purchases, given their value 
function, and the amount of purchases reported on the passing sheet that they received. In 
creating this later variable (E(Own) minus Saw) we used expected own purchases rather 
than actual own purchases to avoid endogeneity.   In creating the data set used in Table 2, 
we excluded economics students (17% of sample), who have been shown in numerous 
other experiments to free ride and/or otherwise be unresponsive to framing effects,  and 
those who were clearly irrational (20%), i.e. they chose consumption levels that had both 
negative private returns and negative social returns. 
  As shown in the second data column of Table 2, the coefficient on Own Purchases 
was significant and positive, suggesting that in the laboratory experiement the level of 
private purchase decisions raised culpability and willingness to pay. The E(own) minus 
Saw and NEP coefficients were, however, not significant.  The latter result is not 
unexpected as the experiment was context-free, and environmental motives are not 
anticipated to be a strong, independent factor in willingness to contribute funds to a group 
investment fund.  Hence,  following on Rose et al. (2002) we added a motive (altruistic) 
variable from part 1b in the following Likert scale questions 
On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is not important and 7 is extremely important, how 
important were the following in your decisions in this experiment? 
1a) I wanted to make as much money as I could for myself (Circle one number) 1   2     3     4      5       6        7 
        Not Important                  Extremely Important 
1b) I wanted the group to make as much money as possible (Circle one number) 
1   2     3     4      5       6        7 
        Not Important                  Extremely Important 
 
As reported in the last column of Table 2, with the addition of this covariate, the 
coefficients for both E(Own) minus Saw and NEP are significant, as is the coefficient for 
Altruism.  Figure 2 depicts the responsiveness of contributions to E(own) minus Saw along 
with the average contributions of the control group) 
  Taken together these two experiments suggest that information about relative 
culpability does affect hypothetical and actual contributions to public goods.  The impact of 
absolute culpability is mixed: it was not significant in the CV study but was a significant 










  Table 1: WTP Regressions CV Study  
Variable  Mean Value (s.e.)  Estimated Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant   -110.07  (51.39) 
Own Carbon Footprint 
[Absolute Culpability] 
19.67 (0.96)  1.22 (0.85) 
Own minus Saw 
[Relative Culpability] 
0.13 (0.60)  2.68 (0.39)** 
NEP  34.87 (0.45)  7.67 (0.67)*** 
n   270 
R-squared   0.12 
Notes: ** and *** indicate 5%  and 1% levels of significance respectively. Robust standard errors 
grouped by treatment group (saw low, saw high) 
 
Table 2: Contributions Regressions, Lab Experiment 




Constant    3.73 (1.17)*  -0.43 (0.82) 
Own Carbon Footprint 
[Absolute Culpability] 
18.53 (0.82)  0.040 (0.010)*  0.115 (0.024)** 
E(Own) minus Saw 
[Relative Culpability] 
5.38 (1.46)  0.0099 (0.0064)  0.157 (0.004)* 
NEP  23.51 (0.55)  -0.079 (0.039)  -0.117 (-3.09)* 
Altruism  3.99 (0.17)    0.908 (0.123)** 
n   100  100 
R-squared   0.03  0.25 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate 10%,  5%  and 1% levels of significance respectively. Robust 
standard errors grouped by demand category (low, medium, high)  Figure 1. Contingent Valuation Survey Green Electricity Purchased =f(Culpability: Est. CO2, 
NEP) 
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1st  2nd 3rd 4th 5th  6th 7th  8th 9th 
Value of the 
unit 
2.20  2.05  1.90 1.75 1.60  1.45 1.25  1.15 1.00 
Cost of the 
unit 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00
 
Your group also shares a GROUP FUND.  This group fund begins with 300 experimental dollars, and at 
the end of the experiment, any dollars in this group fund will be divided equally between all members 
of the group.  Your actions and the actions of other people in your group may change the total amount 
of dollars remaining in the group fund. 
In Round 1, every unit of the commodity that you purchase decreases the number of experimental 
dollars in the group fund by 1.25.  (Because there are five people in your group, every unit of the 
commodity that you purchase reduces the amount in the group fund by 0.25 dollars per person.  
Likewise, every unit of the commodity purchased by everyone else in the group reduces the amount in 
the group fund by 1.25 dollars and therefore costs everyone else 0.25 dollars.) 
Example:  Suppose you choose to purchase zero units of the commodity, and the rest of the group buys 
a total of 20 units.  Your total earnings in this round would be the 9 experimental dollars that you 
chose to keep from your endowment.  The group fund would be reduced by 25 experimental dollars 
(20 units x 1.25 dollars/unit).  275 dollars would be left in the group fund (55 dollars per person). 
Example:  Suppose you choose to purchase 4 units of the commodity, and the rest of your group buys a 
total of 10 units.  Your total earnings in this round would be 12.90 experimental dollars (2.20 + 2.05 + 
1.90 + 1.75 dollars in value from buying four units, plus 5 dollars from the remaining portion of your 
initial endowment).  The group fund would be reduced by 17.50 dollars (14 units x 1.25 dollars per 
unit).  282.50 dollars would be left in the group fund (56.50 dollars per person). 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO. ROUND 6 INSTRUCTIONS: 
Based on the purchase decisions in the first 5 rounds made by you and others in your group, the 
total amount of dollars in the group fund has declined.  
In Round 6 of the experiment, you will again be endowed with 9 experimental dollars.  You can 
keep these dollars, or you can put some or all of them into the group fund.  Every dollar that you 
put into the group fund in this round of the experiment increases the number of dollars in the 
group fund by 1.25 dollars.  Because there are five people in your group, every dollar you spend 
increases the amount in the group fund by 0.25 dollars per person, including yourself. 
You will also be given information as to the total amount of the commodity that a random 
member of your group bought in the first 5 rounds.  You may get your own information back. 
Example:  Suppose there were 50 experimental dollars left in the group fund at the end of Round 
5.  In Round 6, suppose you chose to spend 5 dollars to increase the size of the group fund, and 
the rest of the group chose to spend 15 more dollars to increase the size of the group fund.  The 
group fund would increase by 25 dollars (1.25 dollars/unit x 20 units), to equal 75 dollars (15 
dollars per person.)  In addition, you would have 4 dollars left from your endowment, because you 
spent 5 dollars from your initial endowment of 9 tokens. 
Example:  Suppose there were 50 experimental dollars left in the group fund at the end of Round 
5.  In Round 6, suppose you chose to keep all of your endowment, and the rest of the group chose 
to spend 10 dollars to increase the size of the group fund.  The group fund would increase by 12.5 
dollars (1.25 dollars/unit x 10), and would total 62.5 dollars (12.5 dollars/person). In addition, you 
would have 9 experimental dollars left from your endowment, because you only spent 0 dollars 
from your initial endowment of 9 dollars. 
 
 
 
 